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Maintaining Government Accountability:
Calls for a "Public Use" Beyond Eminent Domain
GREGORY

S.

KNAPP*

"No man's life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in session."'
"Government is a trust, and the officers of the government are trustees;
and both the trust and the trustees are created for the benefit of the people."2

INTRODUCTION

In Kelo v. City ofNew London, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the taking of private
property for the purpose of an economic redevelopment project. 3 The decision has
sparked a flurry of criticism. 4 Much legal commentary calls for heightened scrutiny of
such economic development takings under the public use provision of the Takings
Clause. 5 For these critics, 6 the Supreme Court's deferential standard is deficient in that
it allows special interests to abuse the eminent domain power to pursue their own
economic interests. As a result, governments routinely condemn property on behalf of
politically connected private developers, who offer in return only the speculative
public benefit of stimulating the local economy.
Apart from this line of criticism, this Note argues that seeking increased protection
of private property rights under the public use provision lacks a strong constitutional
basis. The Constitution does not require that economic legislation be free from the
influence of special interests, and this principle is no less true for economic
development takings. Given this weakness of the constitutional argument for
heightened judicial scrutiny, if citizens wish to impose greater restraints on

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. Estate of A.B., 1 Tuck. 247, 249 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1866).
2. Henry Clay, Speech at Ashland, Ky. (Mar. 1829).
3. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Scott Bullock, The Specter of Condemnation, WALL ST. J., June 24,2006, at
A l I(characterizing the approval of the taking of private property for economic development in
Kelo as "the most universally despised Supreme Court decision in decades," setting off "a
nearly unprecedented, grass-roots backlash against eminent domain abuse..."); Michael
Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain Backlash Threatens Some Projects, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 14, 2005, at 39 (reporting on public opinion regarding eminent domain, which, in the wake
of Kelo, was overwhelmingly against the taking of private property for economic development);
Dan Haar, Plan Expertly Before Grabbing, HARTFORD COURANT, July 31, 2005, at Dl
(characterizing Kelo as "a touchstone for a nationwide uprising against 'eminent domain
abuse"').
5. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. As used herein, the "public use provision" refers to the "for public use"
language of the Fifth Amendment.
6. See discussion infra Part I for an overview of the criticism of the Supreme Court's
deferential review of economic development takings.
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legislatures' use of eminent domain for economic development, they must demand
those restraints not from the Federal Constitution, but from state law.
In determining the proper response-if any-to these demands for increased
restrictions on eminent domain, state courts and legislatures should consider the source
of those demands. In particular, this Note suggests that the recent criticism of the
Supreme Court's eminent domain jurisprudence does not stem from a genuine belief
that private property rights are sacred. Instead, these specific attacks against economic
development takings reflect a more general frustration with perceived abuses of the
political process. Consistent with this premise, state decision-makers who are
considering eminent domain reform should recognize anti-Kelo sentiment for what it
is-a genuine call for governmental accountability, but not necessarily a sound basis
for categorically rejecting economic development takings. Courts and legislatures
should accordingly resist the temptation to impose sweeping restrictions on states'
condemnation authority for the sole purpose of amplifying the public outcry against
Kelo. Instead, state decision-makers should engage in eminent domain reform only
where necessary to provide a targeted, measured response to actual deficiencies in
eminent domain practice.
Part I of this Note analyzes the principal Supreme Court cases that have applied
minimal scrutiny to exercises of eminent domain and examines the main arguments for
a heightened standard of review. Part II contextualizes the modem deferential standard
by viewing it in light of the development of the Court's rational basis analysis. This
perspective illustrates that the deference accorded to legislatures' use of eminent
domain is consistent with that accorded to a larger category of economic legislation.
Based on this consistency, the argument for heightened constitutional protections
against the taking of private property lacks substantial merit.
Part III suggests that, given the weakness of the argument for increased judicial
scrutiny of exercises of eminent domain, the recent criticism of economic development
takings does not represent a genuine call for increased constitutional protection of
property rights. Rather, this public outcry against eminent domain is merely
symptomatic of a nationwide frustration with the misuse of public resources to benefit
private interests. It is only the high visibility of a landmark eminent domain case that
makes it a convenient vehicle through which to express a broader dissatisfaction with
failures in government accountability.
Finally, Part IV evaluates recent decisions by state courts and legislatures to restrict
the taking of private property for economic development. Many of these decisions
enforce government accountability in the taking of private property, thereby offering a
reasonable solution to eminent domain abuse. However, other more extreme court
opinions and legislative bills impose sweeping restrictions on economic development
takings, thereby sacrificing a significant portion of states' legitimate eminent domain
authority.
I. ExPANsIvE

READING OF THE PUBLIC USE PROVISION

Over the past half century, the Supreme Court's eminent domain jurisprudence has
adhered to an expansive view of public use, affording legislatures broad discretion to
determine which exercises of eminent domain further the public interest. The Court has
also extended this view to accept economic development as a valid justification for the
taking of private property.
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The starting point is Berman v. Parker,7 where the Court upheld the District of
Columbia's condemnation of a department store as part of a larger project to redevelop
an area ridden with "substandard housing and blighted areas.", 8 Rejecting the argument
that the taking of non-blighted commercial property failed to serve a public use, the
Court held that Congress had the authority to determine that the redevelopment plan
served a "public purpose." 9 The Court found no constitutional violation in the fact that
the recipient of the property was a private developer, rather than the general public,
since "the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been established." 0
Through this "public purpose" standard, the Berman Court adopted a conception of
public use that was unquestionably broad. The subsequent case of Midkiff v. Hawaii
Housing Authority," however, went even further in removing any substantive
protection of private property rights from the public use provision. The Court upheld
an Act authorizing the forced transfer of residential tracts from landowners to existing
tenants, finding that the resultant breakup of a land oligopoly constituted a valid
exercise of the State's police power.' 2 Writing for a unanimous Court,' 3 Justice
O'Connor stressed the importance ofjudicial deference toward a legislative decision to
exercise eminent domain, which the Court would uphold if "rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose.... ,14
Moreover, the Court in no uncertain terms rejected
the notion that the public use provision provides any independent protection against
legislative action: "The 'public
use' requirement is ...coterminous with the scope of a
5
sovereign's police powers."'
Berman'sacceptance of redevelopment as a valid public purpose and Midkiff s even
broader conception of public use intersected in the widely publicized case of Kelo v.
City ofNew London. 16 At issue was the constitutionality of the City's condemnation of
non-blighted residential property as part of an integrated plan to develop an
"economically distressed" area.17 The Court upheld the plan, finding that such a
comprehensive revitalization program "unquestionably serves a public purpose" so as
to "satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment."' 8 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens put forth a principle of deference toward legislative judgment
that was perhaps more qualified than Midkiff s "conceivable public purpose"
standard: 19"[T]he City [would not] be allowed to take property under the mere pretext
20
of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."

7. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
8. Id. at 28.
9. Id. at 32-33.
10. Id. at 33.
11. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
12. Id. at 242.
13. Eight members of the Court joined the opinion in Midkiff(including the author, Justice
O'Connor), but Justice Marshall took no part in the case.
14. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241.
15. Id. at 240.
16. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
17. Id. at 472.
18. Id. at 484.
19. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
20. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
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Nonetheless, the Court accepted economic development as a valid justification for the
use of eminent domain, irrespective of whether the development project confers a
benefit on individual private parties.2
This line of jurisprudence accepts a broad range of public purposes, including
economic development, as sufficient to justify the taking of private property. Many
commentators have attacked this deferential standard, arguing that courts should read
the public use provision more narrowly so as to restrict the use of eminent domain
when it would benefit private parties.
Several critics point to the potential for abuse of eminent domain to benefit special
interests. 22 Absent judicial oversight, politically connected developers are free to
influence government officials to condemn private property on their behalf,
irrespective of the burdens placed upon politically powerless condemnees.23 Related to
this problem of political favoritism, a deferential judicial standard undermines the
basic economic principle of free market negotiation. Unchecked by the courts, private
developers have a strong incentive to appropriate the state condemnation
power in
24
order to bypass the free market and acquire land at less than fair value.
Another line of criticism focuses not on the potential for abuse but on the
speculative nature of economic development takings. Since governments do not hold
private recipients of condemned property accountable to use it in a way that bolsters
the local economy, the ultimate public benefit of the condemnation is dependent on the
recipients' own initiative and success. 25 Hence, the taking does not serve a "public

21. Id. at484.
22. See Steven M. Simpson, JudicialAbdication andthe Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP.
L. REv. 173 (2003) (arguing that rational basis review of laws affecting economic and property
rights encourages special interest legislation). In the context of economic development takings,
Simpson states that a deferential judicial standard allows the condemnation of private property
"on little more than legislative fiat." Id. at 198 (citing DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE
GAIN:

A

FIVE-YEAR STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(2003), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED-report.pdf.
23. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 934 (2003) (arguing for a heightened "means-ends" standard of review of
economic development takings on the ground that rational basis review permits the exploitation
of eminent domain against the politically unorganized); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, andthe Futureof Public Use,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1005, 1008-10 (observing that the "economic development rationale" is
so broad that it can justify any exercise of eminent domain, making economic development
takings particularly prone to abuse by powerful commercial interests at the expense of the poor).
24. See Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving
"Public Use" as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of
New London, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 171,213 (2005) (attacking judicial deference toward economic
development takings as fostering "interest group capture" of the eminent domain power,
allowing special interests to acquire land at a lower cost than that of the free market); Stephen J.
Jones, Note, TrumpingEminent Domain Law: An Argumentfor StrictScrutiny Analysis Under
the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 285,301-02 (2000)
(criticizing the judiciary for erroneously presuming that economic development takings result
from a truly democratic process, when in fact special interests often abuse the eminent domain
power to acquire land more cheaply than the open market price (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 354-55 (1993))).
25. See Fuhrmeister, supra note 24, at 207-09 (distinguishing economic development
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purpose" in that it occurs without any guarantee that the project will produce a net
public gain.26 This lack of accountability is also problematic in that it encourages
developers to seek increasingly favorable concessions from legislatures that are already
willing to condemn property on the developers' behalf. The result is an "economic war
among the states" to attract big business.27
Still other commentators focus on the disproportionate burden borne by the
individual condemnee. These critics argue that, in interpreting the constitutional right
to be free from uncompensated takings, courts should take into account the
"demoralization costs" of condemnation-those psychological burdens associated with
28
losing one's home that are not included in a fair market valuation of the property.
Under a permissive standard of review, however, courts do not require legislatures to
consider these psychological costs, resulting in "inefficient and inequitable eminent
domain actions." 29
11. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSISTENCY OF A HOLLOW PUBLIC USE PROVISION
While the potential abuse of eminent domain has generated understandable
frustration with the Supreme Court's deferential review of economic development
takings, the fact that this abuse may occur does not in itself provide a constitutional
basis for heightened scrutiny. On the contrary, applying minimal scrutiny to the use of
eminent domain is consistent with the modern rational basis standard applied to all
takings from "traditional" takings in that the asserted public benefits derived from the former,
such as increased jobs and taxes, are not guaranteed but contingent on the future success of the
private transferee).
26. See id. at 208 ("When the public purpose derived from a taking is merely a fortuitous
side-effect of the subsequent private use, it is difficult to see how the public benefit is
paramount to the private benefit."); Somin, supra note 23, at 1011 (emphasizing that the lack of
accountability placed on private recipients to deliver the public gains contemplated by the
taking "creates an incentive ... to rely on exaggerated claims of economic benefit..."); Haar,
supra note 4 (urging a drawback from Kelo's permissive standard for approving economic
development takings, "not because private property rights are sacred," but because the asserted
benefits of the taking may not materialize due to "shoddy planning").
27. Ivan C. Dale, Economic Development Incentives, Accountability Legislation and a
Double Negative Commerce Clause,46 ST.Louis U. L.J.247,256-57 (2002) (decrying states'
and localities' seemingly irrational decisions to offer economic incentives to attract business
with no guarantee of a return public benefit); see also Peter M. Agnetti, Comment, Are You Still
Masterof Your Domain?Abuses ofEconomic Development Takings, and Michigan'sReturn to
"Public Use" in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1259, 1273-74 (2005)
(suggesting that, without a federal standard of holding private recipients of condemned land
accountable to deliver promised economic benefits, states and localities will "race to the
bottom" in their competitive attempts to attract private developers).
28. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1306 (1985) (arguing that, because "[sipecific demoralization
costs appear to be greater for eminent domain actions than for other governmental actions," they
should factor into the costs of taking private property); Garnett, supranote 23, at 944-49 (citing
background research in support of the proposition that a fair market valuation of condemned
property does not take into account the property owner's psychological losses).
29. Durham, supra note 28, at 1301; see also Garnett, supra note 23, at 938 (arguing for a
stricter standard of review of economic development takings on the ground that fair market
monetary compensation does not necessarily cover all of the condemnee's losses).
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economic legislation. Accordingly, demands for heightened protection of private
property rights under the public use provision run counter to the Court's wellestablished practice of deferring to legislative judgment in areas of economic policy.
The principle of carefully scrutinizing legislation that affects property rights is not
completely lacking from Supreme Court precedent. In Lochner v. New York, 30 the
Court invalidated a statute prohibiting bakers from working more than sixty hours per
week, holding that the law was an "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference" with the liberty of contract. 31 While acknowledging that the State could
restrict property rights to protect the "general welfare of the public," 32 the Court
concluded that the statute was a "mere meddlesome interference[]" with the liberty of
contract passed under the guise of a health law. 33
Although discredited as a case of judicial activism to protect the rich at the expense
of labor, 34 Lochner articulated a principle of judicially-enforced government
accountability that, if practiced today, could benefit advocates of private property
35
rights. Where a law passes under the "mere pretext" of promoting the public welfare
but in fact originates from "other motives" 36 -abuse of the legislative process to
benefit special interests-a court should strike it as a violation of due process.
However, as of the late 1930s, the Supreme Court had abandoned Lochner's practice
of carefully questioning the public benefit derived from economic legislation in favor
of an increasingly deferential rational basis standard.
In Nebbia v. New York,37 the Court stepped back from the Lochner approach of
protecting private property rights, stressing that the judiciary is generally without
authority to interfere with the economic policies of the states.38 "With the wisdom of
the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it,
the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal. 39
Modem articulations of Nebbia's permissive review of legislation affecting
property rights are even more deferential. An illustrative case is FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., where the Court made clear that legislatures are virtually
unchecked in their decisions to enact socioeconomic policies. Such laws are valid "if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis"

30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. Id. at 56.
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id. at 61.
34. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal Justice
Under Law, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 411, 418-19 (1998) (characterizing the Lochner Court as an
"agent of the wealthy" in its establishment of substantive economic rights and noting that no
such constitutional protection has been extended to the economic rights of the poor).
35. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
36. Id. at 64.
37. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
38. Id. at 538.
39. Id.; see also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) ("Even if the
wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is
entitled to its judgment.").
40. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
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for the legislation. 4 1 Note the striking similarity between this language and Midkiffs
"conceivable public purpose" interpretation of the public use provision.42
Under this modem rational basis standard, the Court seems willing to forgo even the
Nebbia check against "arbitrary" or "capricious" redistributions of wealth to benefit
special interests.43 Responding to a challenge that the proffered justification for the
statutory classification at issue in Beach Communicationsbelied legislative history, the
Court stated, "[w]hether the posited reason for the challenged distinction actually
motivated Congress is 'constitutionally irrelevant.'44
This modem deferential standard of review of socioeconomic legislation leaves
little constitutional basis for substantive protection of private property rights. Given the
Court's self-admitted incompetence to question the wisdom of economic policies, 45 it
is not surprising that the Court is unwilling to second-guess legislatures' taking of
property for economic development. 46 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly highlighted
this parallel between the deferential review of eminent domain proceedings and the
broader standard of deference applied to all socioeconomic legislation. 47 Thus,
contextualizing economic development takings as simply one example of legislative
economic policy, it is apparent that arguments for heightened protection against these
takings have little constitutional backing. Just as the Constitution does not require that
economic legislation be free from the influence of special interests, it does not
invalidate economic development takings that benefit politically connected developers.
Just as the Supreme Court does not demand that economic policies guarantee a net
public benefit, it does not throw out redevelopment projects simply because they
promise only speculative public gains.

41. Id. at 313; see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("[A] legislative choice is
not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data." (quoting Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315)).
42. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
43. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525. Indeed, nowhere in the Beach Communications or Heller
opinions does the word "arbitrary" appear.
44. Beach Commc "ns,508 U.S. at 318 (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980)).
45. See id. at 313 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices"); Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 531.
46. See Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of
RepresentationReinforcement, 83 DENV. U.L. REv. 1, 16 (2005) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court has not developed a heightened scrutiny standard for eminent domain controversies,
despite the sharp criticism of its takings jurisprudence, because "eminent domain was carried
along in the wide stream of judicial deference to economic regulation in the twentieth century").
47. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that the Midkiff public use requirement-that a taking be "'rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose'"-"echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic
regulation" (quoting Midlaff,467 U.S. at 241)); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243 ("[E]mpirical debates
over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of
socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts."); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (indicating that the principle of deference toward social legislation
"admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved").
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Im. DEMANDS FOR A PUBLIC USE BEYOND EMINENT DOMAIN
If, as this Note has argued, calls for heightened protection of property rights under
the public use provision have no particular constitutional basis, 48 why has judicial
approval of economic development takings provoked such extensive criticism? Much
of this criticism focuses on the potential for abuse of the political process and the lack
of accountability imposed on private developers of condemned property. 49 This Part
suggests that these legal arguments directed specifically against economic development
takings reflect a broader frustration with the misuse of government resources to benefit
private interests. Further, given the localized, case-specific nature of condemnation
proceedings, eminent domain jurisprudence provides a convenient venue within which
to criticize these perceived failures in government accountability.
A. Backlashes Against Privatizationand Callsfor Government Accountability
Commentators have noted a shift in public opinion regarding the optimal division of
responsibility between the public and private sectors in the management of government
resources. In contrast to the view of previous decades that privatization was generally
desirable to streamline a large, wasteful government, citizens in recent years have
urged a larger role for the government in monitoring the private entities that provide
public services. 50 Under this emerging view, waste and abuse of public resources
originate not in the government itself, but in those private contractors employed by the
government without adequate oversight.51
This backlash against privatization is indicative of-and is itself reinforced by-a
growing perception among Americans that the government serves special interests at
the expense of the public welfare. This Note does not seek to provide an exhaustive list
of reports of public-private collaborations that have arguably involved abuses of
government power. Nonetheless, because these perceived abuses form the backdrop to
recent state efforts to reform eminent domain practice,52 highlighting the more
prominent examples informs the analysis.
Americans increasingly associate defense spending with the misuse of public
resources to benefit private interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) receives
continual criticism for granting military contracts without imposing sufficient oversight

48. See discussion supra Part II.
49. See discussion supra Part I.
50. See Paul R. Verkuil, PublicLaw Limitations on Privatizationof Government Functions,
84 N.C. L. REv. 397, 417-21 (2006) (comparing past public frustration over the seeming
inefficiencies of government bureaucracy with the modern recognition of the essential role of
the government in overseeing the provision of defense and entitlement programs); David
Brooks, Editorial, From Freedom to Authority, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 12 (contrasting
the conservatism of the 1970s and 1980s, which viewed less government as desirable for
enhancing freedom, with that of the present, which fears not "bureaucrats possessing too much
control" but "ungoverned sources surging out of control").
51. See Verkuil, supra note 50, at 418 (arguing that privatization has reached its limits in
that civil services have been contracted out to such an extent that insufficient government
personnel are available to conduct oversight on the provision of those services).
52. See discussion infra Part IV.
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on private contractors,5 3 and this lack of accountability becomes more problematic as
defense expenditures increase.54 The conflict in Iraq only exacerbates dissatisfaction
with military outsourcing. Charges of political favoritism seem to increase directly
with public
impatience over the apparent lack of success in securing and reconstructing
55
iraq.
Government responses to hurricane damage in the Gulf provide another example of
perceived mismanagement of public resources. Investigators partly attribute the
inadequate response to this national disaster to insufficient oversight in the contracting
out of emergency services. 56 Hence, along with the Iraq conflict, Hurricane Katrina has
been a major subject of criticism of abuse of political power to benefit private
interests.57 The Katrina issue also bears an interesting relationship to economic
development takings. The public's growing distrust over the use of private contractors
to provide emergency relief may make the use of eminent domain for reconstructing
New Orleans politically infeasible.58

53. See, e.g., DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO's HIGH-RISK
PROGRAM, GAO-06-497T, at 13-15 (2006) (reporting on the DOD's continued failure to hold
contractors accountable for delivering services as promised, resulting in billions in wasted
expenditures).
54. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: DOD
VULNERABILITIES TO CONTRACTING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE,

GAO-06-838R, at 3-6 (2006)

(noting that the DOD's expenditures on services provided by the private sector have increased
just as the size of its acquisition workforce has decreased, subjecting more public funds to the
risk of waste, fraud, and abuse).
55. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 50, at 441 (characterizing the conflict in Iraq as a
"bonanza" for private contractors); James Glanz, Series of Woes Mar Iraq ProjectHailed as
Model, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at AI (reporting on the failure of an American construction
company to complete a children's hospital, "the latest in a series of American taxpayer-financed
health projects in Iraq to face overruns, delays, and cancellations"); Frank Rich, Editorial, The
Road from K Street to Yusufiya, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at 13 (decrying the Bush
Administration's "lax privatization of [Iraq's] reconstruction" with "pet companies and
campaign contributors and without safeguards or accountability to guarantee results").
56. See WILLIAM T. WOODS, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA:
PLANNING FOR AND MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL DISASTER RECOVERY CONTRACTS,

GAO-06-

622T, at 6-7 (2006) (reporting that federal agencies deployed insufficient personnel to oversee
private contractors hired to provide disaster relief in response to Hurricane Katrina).
57. See, e.g., Editorial, At Their Bidding-Katrina Works Out Well for Administration's
Friends, Prrr.POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 20, 2005, at B6 (comparing the government's "leisurely
response" to the Katrina catastrophe with the speed with which no-bid contracts were awarded
"to politically well-connected firms whose names you may recognize from the roster of those
rebuilding Iraq"); Molly Ivins, Editorial, HurricanesBringing Out Corruption,BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 28, 2005, at A7 (criticizing the award of $1.5 billion in no-bid contracts for Hurricane
Katrina relief by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as indicative of a
"pattern of crony contracts" and "corporate clout" in the Bush Administration); Rich, supranote
55 (attributing the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina to poor leadership at FEMA, which
had been privatized to such an extent that "there was little government left to manage the
disaster").
58. See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2005, at B2 (suggesting that, while the use of eminent domain may be the only way to attract
the private investment necessary to rebuild New Orleans, "[t]he urgency of government
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These salient, large-scale misuses of public resources reinforce a broader perception
that, increasingly, the government functions not for the benefit of the general welfare,
but for the benefit of politically connected private interests. 59 Viewed within this
context, it is reasonable to conclude that criticism against economic development
takings is simply another indicator of public frustration with widespread failures in
government accountability. Indeed, the arguments offered by those who criticize
economic development takings provide support for this conclusion. The most zealous
opponents of eminent domain focus not on the substantive rights of property owners,
but on the potential for abuse of the political process. 61 States enact legislative
reforms 62 not for the practical purpose of addressing actual eminent domain practice
within their own jurisdictions, but for the expressive purpose of disapproving of
63
Kelo.

Based on this analysis, criticism of economic development takings at the local level
bears a much stronger relationship to government accountability failures at the national
level than it may first appear. Just as commentators attack the transfer of property to
private developers as an abuse of the political process, they allege political favoritism
in the award of federal contracts. Just as the speculative nature of economic
development takings prompts calls for heightened judicial scrutiny, federal agencies'
failure to hold private contractors accountable generates calls for reform. Kelo,
although involving the eminent domain power of a single state, really has served as "a
touchstone for a 64nationwide uprising" against the use of political power to benefit
private interests.

planning ... is offset by the fact that the first contracts went out to some of the usual suspects").
59. See, e.g., Editorial, Backlash, BALT. SUN, Nov. 8,2006, at 22A (attributing the shift in

party power resulting from the 2006 congressional elections to voters' frustration with political
corruption, abuse of power, and special-interest projects); Judy Sarasohn, Under Bush, the
Revolving Door Gains Speed, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2005, at A25 (suggesting that the

movement of personnel between the private and public sectors "contributes to a cynicism about
government-who is making policy and why, and who is making money off public service").
60. See Coleman, supra note 58 (characterizing the backlash against Kelo not as a genuine
defense of American property values, but as a "deeper distrust" that government operates as a
"too-eager partner of private interests").
61. See BERLINER, supra note 22, at 3 (identifying the states' "widespread abuse of eminent

domain... for private benefit and private profit").
62. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
63. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 3, 2006, ch. 84, § 1(a)(1), 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws (finding that
Kelo "demonstrates that an overly expansive application of eminent domain powers can be a
threat to the property rights of all private property owners"); Act of May 18, 2006, ch. 192,
2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1345 (presenting as the purpose of eminent domain legislation a reaction
against the U.S. and Kansas Supreme Courts' approval of "the taking and transferring of private
property from one private party to another..."); CASTLE COALITION, INST. FOR JUST., 50 STATE
REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO 33 (2007),

http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report-card/50_StateReport.pdf (observing that
the Governor of New Hampshire signed eminent domain legislation on the one-year anniversary
of the Kelo decision).
64. Haar, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
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B. The ParticularFocus on Takings

If, as this Note has suggested, attacks against the use of eminent domain to benefit
private interests are merely a symptom of a broader frustration with failures in
government accountability, 65 why have economic development takings generated such
particular criticism within the legal community?
One key factor is the potential for high visibility in eminent domain controversies.
The individual citizen who actively resists the condemnation of private property is
likely to draw media attention, providing a sympathetic figure for calls against abuse of
government power. 66 This high visibility combines with conditions that facilitate
litigation. While systemic waste in the award of military contracts may be highly
visible and detrimental to the public welfare, 67 the frustrated taxpayer has neither the
incentive nor the right 69 to challenge this government mismanagement in court. In
contrast, eminent domain proceedings involve concrete, localized cases in which the
burdens of state action fall disproportionately on a small number of property owners. 7°
Such individualized circumstances are far more likely to generate litigation, and,
resultantly, a Supreme Court decision that may serve as the topic of numerous law
review articles.
In addition to the individualized nature of eminent domain controversies, it is
noteworthy that the Federal Constitution makes explicit reference to the taking of
private property for public use. 7' Although this Note has argued that the public use
provision provides little substantive protection against compensated condemnations,72

65. See discussion supra Part I.A.
66. See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How
FederalGrantsEncourageExcessive Use ofEminent Domain,2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929,934
(comparing the "embarrassingly visible" nature of abuses of eminent domain with less

politically costly means of granting special favors, such as tax breaks and deregulation); Audrey
G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, ConcentratedAffluence and the
Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2006) (noting that the most

publicized controversies surrounding urban renewal projects involve eminent domain, and the
individual property owner who resists condemnation "becomes an embodiment of the status quo
in the face of structural change and often an inadvertent champion of community interests").
67. See discussion supra Part M.A.
68. Durham, supranote 28, at 1307 (comparing the targets of eminent domain proceedings,
who directly observe the consequences of government actions that adversely affect them, with
federal taxpayers, who do not directly link particular government actions with which they
disapprove to their individual tax burdens).
69. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343-48 (2006) (observing that
federal taxpayers have no standing to challenge tax or spending policies by virtue of their status
as taxpayers and holding that state taxpayers also lack such standing).
70. See Garnett, supra note 23, at 944 (suggesting that the taking of a home imposes a
burden on the homeowner that is far greater, even with just compensation, than that imposed on
the taxpayers who must pay for the compensation).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. See Simpson, supranote 22, at 198 (acknowledging but criticizing the fact that courts
have not read the public use provision as providing protection of property rights any greater
than the minimal protections afforded to other, non-enumerated economic rights); discussion
supra Part H.
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the mere presence of the Takings Clause may kindle academic debate over eminent
domain. Coupling this constitutional reference with the case-specific nature of
condemnation proceedings, the issue of eminent domain becomes a convenient vehicle
through which to criticize perceived abuses of government power.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS BY
STATE DECISION-MAKERS

Even accepting that the Supreme Court's modem rational basis review of economic
legislation neither provides substantive protection of property rights nor filters out the
influence of special interests,73 states do not have to accept such a deferential standard
as a good idea. Indeed, Kelo expressly opened the door for states to impose additional
restraints on the exercise of eminent domain, either through judicial interpretations of
state constitutions or legislative initiatives. 74
However, states electing to undertake Kelo's invitation to reevaluate eminent
domain practice should do so with caution. This Note has argued that criticism of
economic development takings stems not from a genuine belief that private property
rights are sacred, but from a widespread dissatisfaction with perceived abuses of the
political process. 75 Consistent with this thesis, state decision-makers who are
considering eminent domain reform should take the public outcry against Kelo for
what it is-a genuine call for governmental accountability, but not necessarily a sound
basis for categorically rejecting economic development takings. Stated another way,
state decision-makers should resist the temptation of using anti-Kelo sentiment as a
basis for imposing unnecessarily draconian restrictions on states' eminent domain
authority.
This Part examines the responses to Kelo by state courts and legislatures. This
analysis reveals that many such responses provide reasonable checks against eminent
domain abuse. Some state-court decisions and legislation, however, take anti-Kelo
sentiment too far and impose categorical restrictions on economic development
takings.
A. JudicialRestrictions on Economic Development Takings
Several state high courts have had the occasion to strike down takings initiated for
the ostensible purpose of economic development. Some of these courts have
invalidated economic development takings on the narrow ground of providing a
judicial check against the most obvious abuses of eminent domain. By adopting an
approach that does not assume that all economic development takings are necessarily
invalid, these courts have successfully resisted the temptation to read too much into the
backlash against Kelo.

73. See discussion supra Part II.
74. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (emphasizing that nothing in
the Court's decision precludes states from imposing greater restrictions on economic
development takings, either as a matter of state constitutional law or through eminent domain
legislation).
75. See discussion supra Part II.
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Other courts, however, have used post-Kelo eminent domain controversies as an
opportunity to impose sweeping, constitutional restrictions on the taking of private
property for economic development. In so doing, these courts have improperly used
eminent domain jurisprudence for the expressive purpose of disapproving of Kelo, at
the cost of unnecessarily restricting states' legitimate use of economic development
takings.
1. Judicially-Enforced Government Accountability
In Rhode IslandEconomic Development Corp.v. Parking Co.,76 the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island scrutinized the taking of The Parking Company's (TPC) contractual
right to operate a parking garage servicing an airport owned by the Rhode Island
Airport Corporation (RIAC). 7 RIAC had invoked the eminent domain power of its
parent company, the Economic Development Corporation (EDC), after RIAC failed in
its negotiations with TPC to acquire the right to operate the garage. 78 The court struck
down EDC's
actions as an "arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith taking of private
79
property."
In reaching its decision, the court relied not on any sweeping expansion of state
constitutional restrictions on eminent domain beyond the federal baseline, but on
specific facts that indicated an abuse of the eminent domain power. 80 In particular,
RIAC had a contractual right to purchase the garage from TPC under a previously
negotiated option agreement; however, making use of EDC's condemnation authority
8
allowed RIAC to acquire the property for substantially less than the option price. 1
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the taking did not represent a
legitimate effort to further a public purpose, but rather a bad-faith commandeering of
the State's eminent domain authority to "alter[] the balance of bargaining power. 8 2
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's approach in ParkingCo. is consistent with this
Note's premise that courts should not restrict the scope of economic development
takings for the mere expressive purpose of disapproving of Kelo. Indeed, the court did
not disapprove, but rather distinguished, Kelo. Unlike the "hasty maneuvering" of
EDC, the condemning authority in Kelo acted pursuant to a "comprehensive and
thorough economic development plan."8 3 By applying this narrow, fact-specific
standard for scrutinizing exercises of eminent domain, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court seems to appreciate that, Kelo notwithstanding,
many economic development
4
takings may serve the public interest.

76. 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006).
77. Id. at 92-93.
78. See id. at 93.
79. Id. at 103 (quoting Romeo v. Cranston Redev. Agency, 254 A.2d 426,434 (R.I. 1969)).
80. See id. at 104.
81. See id. at 104-05.
82. Id. at 106.
83. Id.; see also id. at 104 ("The City of New London's exhaustive preparatory efforts that
preceded the takings in Kelo, stand instark contrast to EDC's approach in the case before us.").
84. See id. at 103 (acknowledging that "traditional notions of public use.., must yield to
'the ever changing conditions of our modem society' such that 'what constitutes a public use
necessarily [varies] with the changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government"'
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At the same time, ParkingCo. responds to the calls for government accountability
that underlie the reaction against economic development takings.8 5 The decision
recognizes that, although courts are generally limited in their ability to review
legislative determinations of what constitutes a "public use," they will nonetheless
step
86
in to prevent takings that represent egregious abuses of the political process.
The reasoning of ParkingCo. obtains further support from its consistency with the
rationales of pre-Kelo state-court decisions invalidating economic development
takings. The courts in these cases obviously did not rule with the expressive purpose of
disapproving of Kelo. Instead, these decisions, like Parking Co., had the more
judicious purpose of curbing abuses of the eminent domain power.
In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority (SWIDA) v. National City
Environmental, L.L.C., 87 the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated SWIDA's
condemnation of private property for transfer to a racetrack operator. The court
acknowledged that "economic development is an important public purpose" that could
justify the use of eminent domain in certain cases. However, because SWIDA failed
to formulate an economic development plan of its own, but rather agreed to condemn
whatever property the racetrack operator desired, the court concluded that SWIDA had
abused its authority. 89 Thus, the peculiar facts of the case, rather than any heightened
standard of review, prompted the court to invalidate the taking. As the court noted, the
purpose of the taking was to bestow "a purely
private benefit," not to serve a "public
9
use" as required by the state constitution. 0
In CasinoReinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) v. Banin, the court denied
CRDA's authority to forcibly transfer private property to facilitate a hotel
redevelopment project. 9 1 As in SWIDA, the court declined to apply a heightened
standard of review to exercises of eminent domain that "result[] in a substantial benefit
to specific and identifiable private parties." 92 However, much like the SWIDA court's
disapproval of the private developer's control over the condemnation process, the
CRDA court reasoned that the discretion afforded to the hotel developer over the use of
the property defeated any finding of a "public purpose." 93 In particular, CRDA did not
condition the transfer of the property on any assurances that the developer would use it
for the public benefits that originally justified the taking. 94 Because the "consequences
and effects" of the condemnation were left to the complete discretion of the private

(quoting Romeo, 254 A.2d at 431)) (alteration in original).
85. See discussion supra Part HI.
86. See ParkingCo., 892 A.2d at 101 ("[A] legislative determination on the issue of public
use... will be accorded deference by this Court, but is not dispositive.").
87. 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (11. 2002).
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 9-10.
91. 727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
92. Id. at 104 (quoting City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs., 689 A.2d 712,721 (N.J. 1997));
see also Twp. of W. Orange v.769 Assocs., L.L.C., 800 A.2d 86,94 (N.J. 2002) (affirming that
New Jersey courts do not apply "heightened scrutiny" to economic development takings, but
rather a "manifest abuse of discretion test").
93. CRDA, 727 A.2d at 110.
94. Id. at 105.
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transferee, the court concluded that "any potential public benefit is overwhelmed by
the private benefit ....
ParkingCo., SWIDA, CRDA, and other state cases restricting the scope of eminent
domain 96 do not offer expressive disapproval of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence, nor do they purport to impose heightened constitutional protections
against economic development takings.97 Instead, these cases represent isolated checks
against the most obvious abuses of public power by unusually influential private
interests. 98 Accordingly, the reasoning of these decisions is consistent with this Note's
argument that courts should contextualize the recent outcry against Kelo as
symptomatic of a broader frustration with the perceived lack of government
accountability.

95. Id.at 111.
96. In addition to the state cases discussed herein, see also Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898,
904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (invalidating under the state constitution the taking of a business at
the request of a private developer as not "'really public"'); Avalon Bay Cmtys., Inc. v. Town of
Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 302 (Conn. 2001) (setting aside the Town's plan to take the property of
a housing developer for construction of an industrial park as adopted in "bad faith" and as a
mere pretext to prevent affordable housing); In re Redevelopment Authority of City of
Philadelphia,891 A.2d 820,831 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (invalidating the City's forced transfer
of property to religious entities to construct a private school as made under the mere pretext of a
public purpose).
97. Not every pre-Kelo decision invalidating economic development takings relied on the
narrow ground of preventing egregious abuses of the political process. In County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782 (Mich. 2004), the court established heightened protections
against economic development takings, holding that transfers of condemned property to a
private entity satisfy the public use requirement of the Michigan Constitution only if the entity
remains accountable to the public in its use of the land. However, the practicability of the
Michigan Supreme Court's requirement that the property "remain[] subject to public oversight
after transfer to a private entity," id. at 783, is questionable. See Agnetti, supra note 27, at
1270-74 (stating that the Hathcock decision "left readers and real property owners guessing as
to how liberally [the public accountability] exception will be applied by the judiciary" and
suggesting alternatives for enforcing the promises of private developers through public
oversight); Boudreaux, supranote 46, at 5 (criticizing proposed reforms to the Supreme Court's
deferential review of exercises of eminent domain, including the Hathcockformula, as "likely to
lead courts into an inextricable bog of trying to assess and weigh the benefits of public
development projects-a fact-finding job that is a legislative, not judicial, function"); Rachel A.
Lewis, Note, Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Michigan Redefines
Implementing EconomicDevelopment Through Eminent Domain, 50 VILL.L. REv. 341,366-67
(2005) (noting that the Hathcock court did not indicate what level of control over the private
developer's use of the condemned property would have satisfied the "public use" requirement).
In any event, one could agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that some level of heightened
scrutiny of economic development takings is appropriate, while still agreeing with this Note's
premise that courts choosing to apply such heightened review should not do so for the mere
expressive purpose of disapproving of Kelo.
98. See Simpson, supra note 22, at 199-200 (characterizing the takings in SWIDA and
CRDA as abuses of eminent domain to "dole out special favors").
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2. Judicial Overreaction
Unlike those state courts that have invalidated takings only where necessary to
prevent an abuse of the political process, some courts have fallen into the trap of using
anti-Kelo sentiment as a basis for imposing severe restrictions on economic
development takings. The Ohio Supreme Court was the first to accept Kelo's invitation
to extend its state constitutional protections against eminent domain beyond the federal
baseline. In City of Norwood v. Horney, the court invalidated the City's exercise of
eminent domain under an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of property falling
within a "deteriorating area." 99 The court rested its decision primarily on the rationale
that the "deteriorating area" test was a "standardless standard," making the ordinance
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. i0 However, the court took the opportunity to
rule much more broadly against economic development takings: "[T]he fact that the
appropriation would provide an economic benefit to the government and community,
standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement of . . . the Ohio
Constitution." 101
Several aspects of this holding suggest that the Ohio Supreme Court was concerned
not with developing a workable standard for reviewing economic development takings,
but with disapproving of the U.S. Supreme Court's deferential review of such takings.
First is the court's observation that, with respect to the limitations on eminent domain
imposed by the Federal Constitution, Kelo represents the "death knell" of the public
use requirement. 102 In addition, the court's application of the law to the facts centered
almost entirely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 03 Indeed, because the City was not
even asserting that an economic benefit alone motivated its decision to condemn,'°4 the
court's pronouncement that such a benefit "cannot serve as the sole basis" for a
taking 10 5 would not seem essential to its decision. For these reasons, Horney's
disapproval of Kelo-type condemnations is more expressive than analytical, and the
decision offers little in the way of an alternative standard of review of economic
development takings.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also had the opportunity to use its state
constitution as an amplifier of anti-Kelo sentiment. In Boardof County Commissioners
of Muskogee County v. Lowery, the court found that the County violated state
constitutional and statutory restrictions on eminent domain by taking easements in
property in order to construct water pipelines that would serve an electricity plant.'06
Much like the Ohio Supreme Court in Horney, the Oklahoma Supreme Court separated
itself from the Kelo decision, holding that "economic development alone does not

99. 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006).
100. Id. at 1146.
101. Id. at 1123.
102. Id. at 1135.
103. See id. at 1142-46.
104. See id. at 1127 (indicating that the lower state court accepted the City's conclusion that
the property was within a "deteriorating area" based on evidence that failing to implement a
comprehensive development plan "could lead to impairment of sound growth, an economic
liability and a menace to the public welfare").
105. Id. at 1141.
106. 136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006).
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constitute a public purpose and therefore, does not constitutionally justify the County's
exercise of eminent domain." 107But also much like Homey' s sweeping disapproval of
economic development takings, Lowery's equivalent holding was arguably
unwarranted by the facts before it. Indeed, the County was not bringing about a
8
"specter of condemnation" by bulldozing a private home in favor of office space. 10
On
the contrary, these takings of easements in land, while ultimately beneficial to a private
utility operator, advanced interests beyond private economic development. 3 9 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion, then, appears to contain a gratuitous element of
joining the outcry against Kelo. Lowery does not provide a workable alternative to the
U.S. Supreme Court's permissive review of economic development takings, but only a
rejection of it.
In sum, several state courts have properly invalidated economic development
takings where necessary to prevent the most egregious abuses of the eminent domain
power. In contrast, cases such as Homey and Lowery have imposed sweeping
constitutional restrictions on states' eminent domain authority for the mere expressive
purpose of joining the public outcry against Kelo. The latter approach fails to
appreciate anti-Kelo sentiment for what it is-a convenient vehicle through which to
express broader frustrations with failures in government accountability, but not a sound
basis for finding heightened constitutional protection of property rights.
B. Legislative Restrictions on Eminent Domain
The preceding discussion illustrates that specific instances may arise where state

courts provide an important check against abuse of the eminent domain power.
Nonetheless, based on the well-established principle of deference toward legislative
determinations of economic policy, the judiciary's role in eminent domain
Hence, if citizens have a genuine desire to impose
controversies is generally limited. 1'0
greater restraints on legislatures' authority to exercise eminent domain, "'1they should
first look to the legislatures themselves. In a majority of states, the people have done
just that. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, forty-two states have passed

107. Id. at 650.
108. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

109. See Lowery, 136 P. 3d at 644 (indicating that the lower state court had authorized the
taking on the ground that it was necessary for the installation of water lines that "'are necessary
for the private electricity generation plant to operate, for the benefit of Muskogee County
residents and the general public"').
110. See R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 103 (R.I. 2006) (embracing a

liberal, evolving view of "public use" and affording broad discretion to the legislature in its
decision to exercise eminent domain); discussion supra Part II.
111. The federal government, of course, also has eminent domain powers. However, the
controversy surrounding eminent domain abuse largely focuses on condemnations by state
authorities. See DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE
POST-KELo WORLD (2006), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgatesreport.pdf (documenting condemnation proceedings either planned or initiated by local
governments since the 2005 Kelo decision). Further, the legislative approach advanced by this
Part is based on the efforts of state governments to restrict their authority to exercise eminent
domain.
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laws, either through legislation or constitutional amendment, that in some way limit
their authority to take property for economic development.112
The wisdom of this rush toward legislative reform is questionable. This Note has
argued that public criticism of economic development takings stems not from a belief
that property rights are sacred, but from a widespread dissatisfaction with perceived
abuses of the political process. Attacks against eminent domain abuse merely provide a
convenient vehicle through which to express these broader frustrations. 113
It stands to
reason, therefore, that this reform movement carries the risk of using anti-taking
legislation not as a targeted response to real problems in eminent domain practice, but
as an expressive outcry against the governance problems that Kelo has come to
represent.
This Part examines characteristic provisions of recent eminent domain legislation
for their consistency with the accountability goals advanced by this Note. Based on
this analysis, reasonable legislative reforms are those that attach greater electoral
accountability to decisions to exercise eminent domain, encourage increased public
scrutiny of condemnation proceedings, and provide additional procedural opportunities
for the condemnee to contest the taking. However, more extreme provisions, such as an
absolute bar on economic development takings, risk taking anti-Kelo sentiment and the
call for political accountability too far.
1. Accountability-Based Legislative Reform
In order to attach electoral accountability to decisions to condemn private property,
some states have passed legislation requiring elected officials to expressly authorize
any economic development taking. Both the Alaska and Kansas legislatures have
passed bills that generally prohibit the taking of property for transfer to a private
developer, but that allow the legislatures to approve such transfers on a case-by-case
basis. 114
Utah has enacted a similar accountability provision that prohibits the taking of
private property "unless the governing body of the political subdivision [within which
5
the property is located] approves the taking."' 1
The Georgia legislature has raised this accountability reform to the constitutional
level; voters have ratified an amendment requiring that "[e]ach condemnation of
privately held property for redevelopment purposes ...be approved by vote of the
elected governing authority ....
116 Florida voters have approved a similar
constitutional amendment. 7
This form of accountability legislation offers a reasonable approach to reforming
eminent domain practice. By requiring elected officials to sign off on all economic
development takings, these provisions impose a high political cost for allowing an

112. CASTLE COALMON, supra note 63, at 1.
113. See discussion supra Part lH.
114. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(d)-(f) (2006);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 26-501a(b), -501b(f)

(Supp. 2006).
115.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4(2)(b) (Supp. 2007).

116.

GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2,

VH(a).

117. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c) (prohibiting transfers of condemned property to a private
party "except as provided by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of
each house of the Legislature").
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exercise of eminent domain that, while strongly supported by private developers, may
not be in the best interest of the public. Hence, these legislative reforms respond to the
extensive body of criticism suggesting that 8economic development takings are
inherently prone to abuse by private interests."
A second favorable component to legislative reform is a requirement that authorities
give full public notice of their plans to exercise eminent domain. For example, the
Minnesota legislature now requires that a public hearing precede the commencement of
condemnation proceedings and that the public receive notice of the meeting through
publication." 9 Under a new Georgia bill, authorities must provide notice of meetings
to approve a condemnation through both publication and a sign posted on the affected
property. 120
These public notice provisions are a key corollary to the electoral accountability
provisions discussed above. Without the increased public scrutiny facilitated by the
former, the latter would not effectively deter officials from abusing eminent domain for
the benefit of politically connected private interests.
Finally, equally important as notice to the public is, of course, notice to the
condemnee. Several of the states' recent eminent domain bills require that the property
owner receive individual notice of a meeting to approve the condemnation, along with
a statement of the right to attend and to object to the proceedings.' 2' Missouri now
requires that condemning authorities provide notice to the condemnee sixty days before
filing the condemnation proceeding, along with a statement of the owner's rights,
which include the opportunity to contest and to seek assistance
from the State's newly22
created Office of the Ombudsman for Property Rights.
These increased procedural mechanisms serve the obvious purpose of affording the
condemnee a full and fair opportunity to contest the condemnation proceedings. The
primary goal of providing this opportunity is to ensure that the property owner is not
marginalized from the political process, which, according to some23commentators, is the
true measure of the justness of an exercise of eminent domain.'
While these increased procedural opportunities are essential to afford political
participation to the private condemnee, they are also effective in imposing greater
burdens of justification on the government condemnor. Faced with the prospect of
genuine opposition by local property owners, officials will be less likely to approve
economic development takings that are not easily defensible as serving the public
interest. Thus, these process-oriented legislative reforms work in tandem with the

118. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.0412(2)(a) (West Supp. 2007).
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-10(a)(1), (3) (Supp. 2007).
121. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-10(a)(2), (d) (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.2D(l)
(West Supp. 2007).
122. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.250 (West Supp. 2007).
123. See Boudreaux, supra note 46, at 47-48 (arguing that the level of scrutiny applied to
exercises of eminent domain should focus not on the end use of the property or the economic
benefit bestowed on private recipients, but on the affected property owner's ability to participate
in the political process); Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the LocalPoliticalProcess,34 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 13, 14-18 (2005) (suggesting that private property rights are best protected by political
safeguards and that the Supreme Court upheld the taking in Kelo precisely because these
safeguards were in place).
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public notification provisions discussed above. Together, these measures reduce an
elected representative's incentive to approve takings that, while trumpeted by private
developers as offering economic revitalization, have only speculative public benefits.
Based on this effect on political incentives, these legislative reforms address the
concerns of some commentators that courts'
24 deferential review of exercises of eminent
domain encourages inefficient takings. 1
2. Legislative Overreaction
In addition to the political accountability mechanisms discussed above, several
states have responded to perceived eminent domain abuse with far more draconian
legislative provisions. For example, many bills passed in the wake of Kelo simply
disallow "economic development" as a sufficient purpose to justify the use of eminent
domain. 125

124. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
125. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1), (3) (barring the taking of private property except for

"public purposes," which do not include "economic development, enhancement of tax revenue,
or any incidental benefit to the public"); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("'Public use' does not
include the taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic
development or enhancement of tax revenues."); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101 (b)(I) (West
2007) (disallowing "the taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose
of economic development or enhancement of tax revenue" as not a "public use"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(B) (Supp. 2007) ("The public benefit of economic development shall not
constitute a public use."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting the
exercise of eminent domain for "the purpose of promoting or effectuating economic
development"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22(2)(b) (West Supp. 2007) (excluding economic
development activities from the definitions of "public use," "public purpose," and "public
improvement"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (prohibiting the
"condemnation of private property for transfer to a private owner for the purpose of economic
development that benefits the general public only indirectly, such as by increasing the tax base,
tax revenues, employment, or by promoting the general economic health of the community");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West Supp. 2007) ("No condemning authority shall acquire private
property ... for solely economic development purposes."); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 76710.04(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (disallowing a taking that is "primarily for an economic
development purpose"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-K:2, IX-a(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)
("[P]ublic use shall not include the public benefits resulting from private economic development
and private commercial enterprise, including increased tax revenues and increased employment
opportunities."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-01(3) (Supp. 2007) ("[A] public use or a public
purpose does not include public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax
base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17102(2) (Supp. 2006) ("'Public use' shall not include either private use or the indirect benefits
resulting from private economic development and private commercial enterprise, including
increased tax revenue and increased employment opportunity...."); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
2206.0001(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (prohibiting the taking of private property "for economic
development purposes, unless the economic development is a secondary purpose"); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (Supp. 2006) (disallowing a taking that is "primarily for purposes of
economic development"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-2(a)(1 1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) ("[I]n no
event may 'public use' . . . be construed to mean the exercise of eminent domain primarily for
private economic development.").
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Of course, states have the right to impose whatever restraints they wish over their
authority to condemn property. However, this categorical exclusion of economic
development from the legitimate scope of eminent domain embraces the outmoded
conception of "public use" that the Supreme Court rejected as unworkable. 126 This
approach is also problematic in that it may prohibit states from engaging in
redevelopment projects that deliver an unquestionable public benefit. 127 In these cases,
where the use of eminent domain would serve the public interest and occur with full
procedural protections for the condemnee, it makes little sense to disallow the taking
1 28
merely because it falls within the disfavored category of "economic development."
Rather than deny legislatures the ability to develop a "carefully formulated" economic
development plan, 129eminent domain reform should ensure that legislatures implement
those plans in a manner that maintains the integrity of the political process.
Another recurring feature of eminent domain legislation is a requirement of
stepped-up compensation for the taking of homes. These provisions focus not on
political accountability throughout the condemnation process, but on mitigating the
burden placed on the individual condemnee. For example, Missouri now requires that,
in the case of such a "homestead taking," the State provide a minimum compensation
of 125% of the fair market value of the property. 30 Kansas's new standard for
compensation is potentially more extreme, but remarkably pliable: where the
legislature exercises its authority to override the general prohibition on economic
development takings, it "shall consider
requiring compensation of at least 200% of fair
131
market value to property owners."'

126. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,479 (2005) (dismissing a narrow definition
of public use as "impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society").
127. See Theodore C. Taub, Post-Kelo:Emerging Impacts andIssues in Eminent Domain,
SM004 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1721, 1772 (2006) (questioning the appropriateness of the legislative
response to Kelo in light of the fact that "[r]edevelopment is a necessary tool in enhancing the
public's quality of life"); Terry Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a World Without Eminent
Domain, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (commenting on the legislation passed in the wake of
Kelo and suggesting that "weakening or destroying the power to condemn property will
seriously undermine efforts to rehabilitate decaying cities and might even hinder the rebuilding
of New Orleans").
128. Critics of the result in Kelo may argue that the taking of private property for the
purpose of economic development is not in any event justifiable. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen,
Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic
Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 491, 497-98 (2006) (acknowledging that
Kelo was the right result under Supreme Court precedent but arguing that, because economic
development takings are unjust and not particularly effective at revitalizing economically
distressed areas, legislatures should ban them). However, one can question the wisdom of
economic development takings while still accepting this Note's premise that, to the extent that
legislatures desire to deprive themselves of this significant redevelopment tool, they should do
so not as a hasty, expressive reaction against the abuse of public power that Kelo has come to
represent, but as a carefully considered determination that the public costs of economic
development takings outweigh the public benefits.
129. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
130. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.039 (West Supp. 2007).
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b(f) (Supp. 2006).
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This Note does not dispute the independent merits of these advanced compensation
provisions. They provide a reasonable, if not complete, response to the concerns of
many commentators that current eminent domain practice fails to take into account the
high "demoralization costs" associated with the taking of one's home.' 32 Nonetheless,
these provisions do not address the need for transparency and accountability in the use
of eminent domain. If, as this Note has argued, public frustration with eminent domain
practice stems from perceived abuses of the political process, requiring that the
legislature waste twenty-five percent more of the public's funds in acquiring the
property is hardly a solution. Instead, if eminent domain legislation is to provide a
meaningful response to government accountability failures, its provisions must impose
political restraints on the decision to take property.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not read the public use provision of the Federal
Constitution as providing substantive protection against the compensated taking of
private property. On the contrary, the Court's broad interpretation of "public purpose"
has expanded to include transfers of property to private parties for economic
development. This judicial deference has invited much criticism; many commentators
argue that heightened review of economic development takings is necessary to guard
against the abuse of eminent domain by special interests. Nonetheless, the deferential
standard applied to legislatures' use of eminent domain dovetails the rational basis
review applied to a broader category of economic legislation. Accordingly, calls for
stricter readings of the public use provision have no particular constitutional basis.
Based on the weakness of the argument for heightened judicial review, it is unlikely
that the extensive criticism of economic development takings represents a genuine call
for increased constitutional protection of property rights. Rather, demands for a "public
use" of condemned property are merely a proxy for demands that all government
resources be used on behalf of the public. While the image of the private homeowner
standing against the state-sponsored developer may be especially compelling, the
particular outcry against economic development takings actually reflects a deeper
frustration with the mismanagement of public resources.
Unfortunately, several state courts and legislatures have failed to contextualize the
public backlash against the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo as merely symptomatic
of a broader frustration with failures in the political process. Instead, these decisionmakers have taken anti-Kelo sentiment to the extreme, imposing severe restrictions on
states' authority to initiate economic development takings. These sweeping judicial
and legislative reforms are problematic in that, at best, they serve only the expressive
purpose of disapproving of Kelo without addressing any real problems in the
condemnation process, and, at worst, they unnecessarily restrict the legitimate scope of
states' eminent domain authority.
More importantly, this overreaction against economic development takings misses
the broader point of government accountability. If this Note is correct that the
particular outcry against eminent domain abuse reflects a broader, nationwide call for
government accountability, then state officials should not limit their response to

132. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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passing an anti-taking bill. Rather, the real solution to the accountability problem that
Kelo has come to represent is a renewed commitment to legitimate political processes
and a continuing insistence on the responsible use of public resources. It is a solution
that, somewhat ironically, Kelo already demands. 133

133. See R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 104 (R.I. 2006) (interpreting
Kelo as requiring "good faith and due diligence" on the part of a condemning authority);
Gillette, supra note 123, at 17 (concluding that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Kelo
implicitly imposed a requirement that a taking be free from "any apparent political process
failure").

